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Abstract: This article tries to present the most current 
phenomenon of how moderate Islam can live side by side 
with radical Islam. By focusing its analysis on the dynamics 
of political life in Bangkalan, Madura, the paper argues that 
the encounter between these two different ideological 
streams is possible under particular circumstances. First, 
there is a specific political situation where the moderate 
Islam is able to control the political posts. Second, there is 
a forum where they can articulate Islamic ideas in terms of 
classical and modern political movements. This study has 
also found out that the binary perspective applied in the 
analysis of Islamic movement is not always relevant. The 
fact, as in the case of Bangkalan, is far more complex, in 
which NU and Islamic Defender Front (FPI) can merge. 
This is so because at the beginning, FPI’s management in 
the city is led by kyais or/and prominent local NU leaders.  
Keywords: Radicalization, de-radicalization, moderate 
Islam, radical Islam. 
Introduction 
A discussion on the topic of contemporary Islamic movements is 
filled with various reviews about radical Islam. As news, academic 
work also has its own actual considerations. The September 11th 
incident seems to be a “productive” momentum to tap a new academic 
debate which was previously conducted only by a few people who 
were really making Islam and its socio-political life as an academic 
project. Islamism, in its violence and atrocity, then became a popular 
theme that filled almost all the scientific discussion that took ideology 
and contemporary Islamic movements as a main topic. This 
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multiplication theme was reinforced by the project of “War on Terror” 
that was designed to define a scheme of new relationship between 
Islam and the West. 
It is nothing new that any political project that involves a 
relationship between two civilizations is often accompanied by various 
academic projects. Orientalism, for instance, apart from the develop-
ment and critical attitude that come from within, is the academic 
project that is directly linked to imperialism at first.1 In fact, 
anthropology is not immune from these imperialistic “sins.”2 
To mark the study of radical Islam as a trending topic today, 
constantly emerging perspective is the use of binary oppositions: 
moderate versus radical,3 puritan versus pluralism,4 democrat versus 
Islamist,5 liberal versus conservative,6 and some other binary 
                                                                
1 Edward Said’s writings remain the most representative sources in viewing the 
relationship between Orientalism and imperialism. Orientalism, at least, at the 
beginning of its age, was a way of how the West looked at the East-Islam which was 
characterized by superior-inferior, civilized-uncivilized, high-low. See Edward Said, 
Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979). 
2 Koentjaraningrat, Pengantar Ilmu Antropologi (Jakarta: Rineka Cipta, 2009), pp. 3-4. 
3 Stephen Sulaiman Schwartz, Dua Wajah Islam: Moderatisme vs Fundamentalisme dalam 
Wacana Global, translated by Hodri Ariev (Jakarta: Libforall, Blantika, The Wahid 
Institute, Center for Islamic Pluralism, 2007). 
4 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam: Puritanisme versus Pluralisme, 
translated by Heru Prasetia (Bandung: Throne, 2003). This book is actually a collection 
of papers written by Khaled Abou el-Fadl and many other intellectuals who respond 
the latter’s ideas. Its contents speak about the two currents of Islamic thought and 
movement in viewing tolerance and relationship between Islam and the West. This 
book was originally entitled The Place of Tolerance in Islam, which later changed its title 
into Indonesian language as above because it reflects the dispute between the 
puritanists and the pluralists. 
5 Robert W. Hefner, “Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence in Post-Soeharto 
Indonesia,” in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, 
Democratization (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
6 Caryle Murphy, Passion for Islam: Shaping the Modern Middle East: The Egyptian Experience 
(New York: Scribner, 2002); Virginia Hooker, “Developing Islamic Arguments for 
Changing through Liberal Islam,” in Virginia Hooker and Amin Saikal (eds), Islamic 
Perspectives on the New Millenium (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004); Leonard Binder, Islam Liberal: 
Kritik Terhadap Ideologi-Ideologi Pembangunan, translated by Imam Muttaqin (Yogyakarta: 
Pustaka Pelajar, 2001); Rumadi, Post Tradisionalisme Islam: Wacana Intelektualisme dalam 
Komunitas NU (Jakarta: DEPAG RI, 2007). 
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categories.7 In such a frame of mind, Islam is seen as blocks of 
community, school of thought, method of movement, and isolative 
school of teaching. 
This is not to say that scientific analysis should not be doing 
categorization. However, the category that originated from an 
academic research to see variations in the community is often treated 
as real spaces where occupants are isolated from each other.8 What is 
going to dealt with in this paper is to open a new perspective that is no 
longer strictly burdened by binary category of moderate Islam versus 
radical Islam. There are meeting rooms between the two, which may 
not be permanent, but there are also moments of tension in certain 
cases. All these phenomena become so complex that it is not likely 
enough to be portrayed with too tight and stiff approach employing a 
binary category. 
Reductive risk of way of thinking in terms of binary opposition 
and absolute categories of moderate Islam versus radical Islam in 
contemporary Indonesia may be easily seen when we are dealing with a 
case of the following: on February 22nd, 2011, PWNU (Pengurus 
Wilayah Nahdlatul Ulama/Provincial Branch of Nahdlatul Ulama) of 
East Java held a seminar at Hotel Bumi Surabaya in commemoration of 
                                                                
7 See, M. Imdadun Rahmat, Arus Baru Islam Radikal: Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur 
Tengah ke Indonesia (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2005); Norani Othman (ed.), Muslim Women and 
The Challenge of Islamic Extremism (Selangor: Sister in Islam, 2005); Thoha Hamim, Islam 
& NU di Bawah Tekanan Problematika Kontemporer (Surabaya: Diantama, 2004), within 
the sub-title: “Islam Militan versus Islam Moderat: Perilaku Politik Kaum Islam Militan 
di Masa Pemerintahan Presiden KH Abdurrahman Wahid”; some other works discuss 
the radical Islam movement, which is explicitly in opposition to the moderate Islam. 
Read Itzchak Weismann, “Sa’id Hawwa: The Making of Radical Muslim Thinker in 
Modern Syria,” in Syafiq Mughni (ed.), An Anthology of Contemporary Middle Eastern 
History (Montreal: Indonesia-Canada Islamic Higher Education Project, n.d.); Jamhari 
and Jajang Jahroni (eds), Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia (Jakarta: PT Raja Grafindo 
Persada, 2004). 
8 Critics of this reasoning are advanced by Beatty on categorization made by Geertz on 
Javanese Islamic character. According to him, Geetz’s theoretical framework in making 
such category as santri, abangan, and priayi is being outrageous and exaggerated when he 
delineated and treated it as tight spaces and unbridgeable distance among the three. As 
if, a category was the iron prison which was not possible for each category to negotiate 
and interpenetrate with the equal degree of activity and consciousness. See Andrew 
Beatty, Variasi Agama di Jawa: Suatu Pendekatan Antropologi, translated by Achmad 
Fedyani Saefuddin (Jakarta: Murai Kencana, 2001); See also Harsya W. Bachtiar, “The 
Religion of Java: A Commentary Review,” in Clifford Geertz, Abangan, Santri, Priyayi 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1983). 
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the 88th birthday of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama).9 It was nothing special as 
the anniversary of NU is yearly celebrated. That seemed unusual was 
the presence of the leading leaders of FPI (Front Pembela 
Islam/Islamic Defender Front), Rizieq Shihab and Munarman. The 
attendance of Rizieq was special because he was invited to be a guest 
speaker at the seminar. Rizieq was not only honored as a guest, but 
also recognized as part of NU as stated by Hasyim Muzadi in his 
speech that “Habib Rizieq is NU and he often said that he was NU.” 
In fact, Muzadi provided a defense in order that FPI was not 
dissolved.10 
NU is known as a moderate Islamic organization, where its 
moderation is often contrasted with the usual violence carried out by 
radical Islamic groups. Meanwhile, FPI is commonly known as the 
Islamist group who likes to do violence. Such a definition of 
moderation is often stated by NU leaders who look FPI differently 
from NU. NU represents moderate Islam, while FPI is radical Islam. 
But at the time, the number one person of FPI was invited as a guest 
speaker to discuss the vision of his Islam and was recognized as part of 
NU. 
It was indeed a very strange scene. The moderation of NU seemed 
to melt and fuse into the FPI’s violent face. There was no longer 
restriction or at least, it became increasingly blurred. If everyone was 
so easy to hear the difference between the moderation of NU and the 
radicalism of FPI from NU leaders previously, the forum seemed to 
erase the distinction. FPI has now become a part of NU. At least, one 
might have thought that the violent character of FPI can also be a part 
of the Islamic movement of NU, or, the moderateness of NU could 
become part of the radical movement of FPI. 
This phenomenon, of course, has spawned a lot of confusion and 
questions. This is reflected in the writing of an activist of NU in 
Yogyakarta who has been proud of NU’s moderation for being able to 
be a barrier to the dissemination of radical Islamist movements. He 
wrote that: 
...apparently, FPI and NU now start to meet. Some time 
ago, FPI’s chairman, Rizieq Sihab was invited/present in 
gathering with KH. Hasyim Muzadi (as well as the other 
                                                                
9 http://www.tempointeraktif.com, accessed on March 22nd, 2011. 
10 http://nasional.vivanews.com, accessed on March 23rd, 2011. 
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speakers) in the harlah of NU at PWNU East Java. Even, in 
the forum, the moderator called Rizieq as the representation 
of radical NU. What the indication is this …?11 
The book Ilusi Negara Islam (Illusion of an Islamic State) sees this 
phenomenon as the Islamist infiltration into the institutions or 
organizations that Islam is known as a moderate character. Both of 
NU and Muhammadiyah are surely the target of such infiltration. 
Extremists do not only infiltrate into NU and Muhammadiyah, but 
also “take over” the mosques and schools, even they go to pesantrens 
(Islamic boarding schools).12 
However, the presence of Rizieq Shihab in an important event of 
PWNU East Java did not confirm the existence of these intrusions. 
Infiltration presumes an unequal position, with one is active and 
another one is passive. However, what happened in that event did not 
indicate the passivity of one of the parties, unless NU looked so 
“stupid” that falls into the trap set by such a shrewd one like Shihab. 
This paper highlights the latest development of the Islamic 
movement in Indonesia. As stated by Bubalo and Fealy,13 a growth of 
radical Islamic movements in Indonesia is largely derived from the 
outside, but Indonesia itself is a ground for seeding dawn every 
doctrine and Islamic movements. Whatever sticks planted on the 
ground, it would become a fruitful tree. This means that Indonesian 
Islam provides a very open and a very broad opportunity for any 
doctrine to come and influence each other. In this dialectical situation, 
the discrete concept of moderate versus radical Islam needs to be 
tested again. 
The encounter between NU and FPI is not unknowingly presented 
because they directly represent the two concepts: moderate versus 
radical Islam. NU is known as a moderate Islamic organization. NU’s 
moderation was born from the Islamic thought typical to the 
traditionalists. One of the basic characters of NU is its tolerance to 
various local traditions, a fundamentally different attitude to the 
                                                                
11 Posted by Ahmad Shidqi, bahtsulmasail-nu@yahoogroups.com, accessed on 
February 27th, 2011. 
12 Abdurrahman Wahid (ed.), Ilusi Negara Islam: Ekspansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di 
Indonesia (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, Gerakan Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, Maarif 
Institute, 2009). 
13 Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and 
Indonesia (Alexandria: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005). 
 
 
 
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 01, June 2013 
76 
puritan who is very obsessive with pure Islam, which make him lose an 
appreciation and tolerance of the local culture. Appreciation to the 
tradition, either classical or local, could be called the inner spirit of the 
organization founded by Hasyim Asy’ari in Surabaya in 1926.14 
Bangkalan, Madura is chosen as the region to see the new direction 
of the Islamic movement in Indonesia. Lifting Madura in the 
discussion of NU is like sorting the sugar out of its sweetness. The 
identity of NU-Madura is an Islamic society itself. Some experts 
associate this phenomenon with pesantrens that have been the main 
base of NU. As a typical of Islamic educational institutions, Islamic 
boarding schools are very closely tied to the culture of Java and 
Madura. As a result, one should not be surprised if they grow and 
thrive in this region. That is why NU becomes a religio-cultural 
identity of the Madurese in general.15 
Bangkalan and NU 
Bangkalan is one of the four districts in Madura. This district is the 
westernmost and connecting Surabaya to Madura island. Before the 
opening of the longest bridge, Suramadu, in 2009, Kamal, one of the 
sub-districts in Bangkalan, was a dock where ferries were crossing 
from Surabaya to Madura or vice versa. 
As historical cities in Java began to exist at about the early of the 
Islamic kingdom of Java, the historiography of Bangkalan also began 
to be written in this era. Historical records of Bangkalan began in the 
mid of the 16th century (1531 AD), which was known as “age of 
                                                                
14 Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker (eds.), Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A 
Contemporary Sourcebook (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), p. 40. 
15 Laode Ida, NU Muda: Kaum Progresif dan Sekularisme Baru (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2004), p. 
2; The cultural specificities appear such as in obedience, submission, and their 
surrender hierarchically to the four major figures in their life, moreover in religious 
praxis: Buppa, Babbu, Guru, and Rato (father, mother, teacher, and leader of the 
government). To the four major figures, the Madurese’s hierarchical compliance shows 
its form in the social life of their culture. The use and mention of the term Guru refers 
and emphases on understanding and attention of Kyai-pesantren to religious 
development in Islamic boarding house. Kyai is the most influential figure for the 
Madurese. Teacher (kiai) is an assurance of morality issues and problems of hereafter. 
It is understandable that the Madurese’s obedience to kyai or teacher is based on those 
reasons. See A. Latief Wiyata, Carok Konflik Kekerasan dan Harga Diri Orang Madura 
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2006), p. 1. 
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sainthood”. Inevitably, the history of Bangkalan was closely associated 
with the history of Islam in Madura island.16 
In the context of the establishment and development of NU, 
Bangkalan occupies a key position. The founder of NU, Kyai Hasyim 
Asy’ari, was the pupil of Kyai Cholil Bangkalan.17 When Abdul Wahab 
Hasbullah proposed his wish to Hasyim Asy’ari to establish an 
organization that was later called NU, the latter did not confirm until 
he got a spiritual endorsement from Kyai Cholil Bangkalan. After 
getting permission from Bangkalan, Hasyim finally made a decision, 
“Allah has allowed us to establish an organization”.18 
Up to now, the descendants of Kyai Cholil Bangkalan become kyai 
who are highly respected by the Muslim community there. They are 
the role model for Muslims in Bangkalan, even in Madura in general. 
Pesantren of Syaichona Cholil Bangkalan can be regarded as the site of 
Islamic reference for Muslims in Madura. This pesantren occupies an 
important position in the whole movements of Muslim communities in 
the district. It can be said that this pesantren has been the axis of all 
Muslims in Bangkalan, the majority of which is NU. All religious, 
political, and cultural movements that enter into Bangkalan require 
legitimacy from Kyai Cholil’s families if they wish to be accepted by the 
community there. 
FPI Bangkalan: The Melting of Moderatism and Radicalism 
FPI (Islamic Defender Front) was born on August 17th, 1998 by 
the chairperson Muhammad Rizieq Shihab. After it was established in 
Jakarta, FPI established branches in West Java, Lampung, Palembang, 
North Sumatra, East Java, Sulawesi, Ambon, Maluku, Tual, and 
Borneo. It now exists in almost all the provinces of the country. 
The history of FPI in Bangkalan, Madura, began in 2004, when 
Rizieq Shihab gave religious lecture in the sub-district Blega, 
Bangkalan.19 His coming to this district was made possible by the 
                                                                
16 http://www.bangkalankab.go.id, accessed on February 3rd, 2011. 
17 Lathiful Khuluq, “K.H. Hasyim Asy’ari: “Profil Pejuang dari Jombang,” in Jajat 
Burhanudin and Ahmad Baedowi (eds), Transformasi Otoritas Keagamaan: Pengalaman 
Islam Indonesia (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2003), p. 48. 
18 See, Choirul Anam, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan NU (Surabaya: Duta Aksara Mulia, 
2010). 
19 See, Mohammad Tikno Muyono, Dakwah Front Pembela Islam (FPI) di Kabupaten 
Bangkalan; Studi Kualitatif tentang Gerakan Amar Ma’ruf Nahi Munkar (Unpublished 
thesis, Dakwah Faculty, IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, 2009). 
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student of KH. Abdul Munif Pamekasan who was captivated by the 
views of Rizieq. When he invited Rizieq in Blega, he deliberately 
invited a great deal of religious and community leaders of Bangkalan. 
One of those invited was Nasir Zaini, a prominent businessman 
who was also influential figure within the local organizations, the 
Association of Madura Family (IKAMRA) and Madura United Forum 
(FORMABES). At that moment, there was an informal agreement to 
establish FPI in Bangkalan. Rizieq asked Nasir Zaini to become the 
interim coordinator. 
Nasir Zaini began to recruit members and approached the 
community leaders and kyais in that region. One of the important 
figures who successfully approached was the pesantren’s caregiver 
Syaichona Cholil I, KH Abdullah Schal, tweet of Kyai Cholil Bangkalan. 
Finally, on September 3rd, 2005, when the pesantren held h}aflat} al-
imtih}a>n wa al-ikhtiba>r, Rizieq Shihab was invited as a speaker, and it was 
also attended by some influential kyais in Bangkalan. At that time, it 
was then performed a limited discussion to formulate the 
establishment of Regional Leadership Board of the Islamic Defender 
Front (FPI) in Bangkalan. 
H }aflat al-imtih}a>n is very crucial for the existence of FPI in 
Bangkalan in the future. Although the September 5th, 2005 is 
considered as the date of the establishment of the FPI Bangkalan, but 
h}aflat al-imtih}a>n event can be considered as an open declaration of the 
establishment of FPI in Bangkalan. 
At the early time of FPI’s management in Bangkalan, the big 
families of pesantren Syaichona Cholil had occupied a key position. It 
could be said that the Kademangan family, another term for the 
descendants of Kyai Cholil, was the controller of FPI Bangkalan. The 
chairman of the Shura Council was held by K.H. Abdullah Schal, while 
the chairman of Tanfidz was K.H. Fahrillah Aschal. FPI Bangkalan 
domiciled and headquartered in the city of Bangkalan, precisely at 
pesantren of Syaichona Cholil I in Kademangan, Bangkalan. 
In this initial period, FPI immediately performed some strikes. 
Many people claimed that FPI Bangkalan under Fachrillah Aschal had 
become a highly respected organization as its assertiveness and 
prowess in combating immorality issues. The presence of FPI in 
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Bangkalan was considered to be able to act as a motor in eradicating 
disobedience.20 
Pesantren’s and NU’s Response  
On June 1st, 2008, AKKBB (National Alliance for Freedom of 
Religion and Belief) held a rally in Monas Jakarta to commemorate the 
anniversary of Pancasila. The alliance was made up of various 
institutions and figures that had been concentrated on advocating the 
right to freedom of religion and belief. The rally, which was designed 
as a peaceful activity was going to call for Indonesia’s bhinneka tunggal 
ika under Pancasila which was critically endangered by forces that 
impose their will and did not appreciate diversity. 
Such a friendship nuanced activity since involved family members 
(husband/wife and children) suddenly turned into chaos when the 
Islamic Army Command (the main element of FPI paramilitary force) 
attacked and beat up participants of rally. This was one of the open 
violence committed by FPI to pro-democracy groups. 
Immediately, FPI’s assault got harsh reactions from various parties. 
Almost all people condemned the FPI’s anarchy. As response to this 
anarchy, Ansor, youth organization under NU, called on its paramilitary 
forces (Banser) to fight the FPI’s tyranny.21 The call was apparently 
effective. Ansor with its Banser was being part of a wave of protest 
everywhere condemning and demanding the dissolution of FPI, not 
least in East Java. 
In Banyuwangi, the local Shura Council of FPI, KH Samsul 
Ma’arif, officially retired from management after pressed by Ansor. In 
Probolinggo, dozens of mass called as “Defender of Gus Dur” 
reached the local chairman of FPI, Habib Lutfi. Not just at the eastern 
of East Java FPI received pressure to be disbanded, in Blitar, a local 
FPI was also urged to be disbanded by the mass called Defender Front 
of National Awakening (FPKB).22 
Under the pressure to be disbanded, FPI branch Madura refused 
to disperse.23 The FPI’s coordinator of Madura region, Bahri Asrawi 
said: “FPI in Madura has good relation with Banser and Garda Bangsa 
                                                                
20 Interview with Deputy Secretary of PCNU Bangkalan, HM Toyyib Muslim Fawwaz, 
March 5th, 2011. 
21 Banser (Barisan Ansor Serbaguna) is a paramilitary force that is under Ansor. 
22 http://www.nuonline.com, Jun 5th, 2008, accessed on February 3rd, 2011. 
23 http://www.detikSurabaya, Jun 4th, 2008, accessed on February 3rd, 2011. 
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(security forces of National Awakening Party), although in other places 
experiencing tension.24 
The story of the tension between FPI and NU in 2008 as well as 
FPI's insistence in Madura not to disband by the reason of a good 
relationship with NU, tells us something about FPI in Madura. What 
stated above by Bahri Asrawi is not something ridiculous. The history 
of FPI’s establishment in Bangkalan confirms the truth of the 
confession. Since its inception, FPI Bangkalan has been handled by 
pesantren’s leaders who are also the prominent leaders of NU. Even in 
2008 there was an open tension between the institutions affiliated to 
NU with FPI, but this was not able to deny the closeness in 
relationship between NU and FPI. 
This closeness can also be seen in the case of the mid-2008. The 
case stemmed from the report that Bindara Ali, chairman of Istigha>thah 
Dhikrulla>h Qotbul Ghaiz, had issued by stating “it is not the sin of 
fornication, the existence of heaven and hell is a lie, and God is as 
created beings.” These issues came to Islamic Defender Front (FPI), 
which was then forwarded to the Council of Indonesian `Ulama>’ and 
NU. Following that, the dialogue was held in the office of PCNU 
Bangkalan which involved MUI, NU, FPI, Laskar Jihad, Kesbang 
Bangkalan, Bangkalan police, prosecutors, Muspika Klampis, and head 
village of Bator to clarify the news to Bindara Ali. The parties who 
presented then concluded that what was said by Bindara Ali was 
misguided.25 
The people did not look at the relationship between NU 
Bangkalan and FPI. In general, the views of NU leaders towards FPI 
are relatively positive. They cannot surely accept the FPI violence, but 
they can accept rigorous propaganda and implementation of al-amr bi 
al-ma‘ru>f wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar (commanding good and forbidding 
wrong) because it is considered as an accurate way to eliminate 
immorality in society. NU’s figures greatly respect FPI’s firmness in 
implementing the concept of al-amr bi al-ma‘ru>f wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar, 
something they said could not be done by NU so far. 
If they then join the FPI’s movement, it means that they do not 
perform any betrayals of the NU’s principles because NU, as an 
                                                                
24 http://www.nuonline.com, Jun 5th, 2008, accessed on February 3rd, 2011; 
http://www.seputarjatim.com, Jun 4th, 2004, accessed on February 3rd, 2011. 
25 http://www.tabloidposmo.com, August 10th, 2006, accessed on February 3rd, 2011. 
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Islamic organization, believes that it should do an Islamic propagation 
(da’wah Isla>mi>yah). Da‘wah al-Isla>miyyah in the sense of al-amr bi al-ma‘ru>f 
wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar is also the teaching embraced by NU. So that, 
principally, no conflict between NU and FPI. Therefore, al-amr bi al-
ma‘ru>f wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar implemented by FPI can be accepted by 
NU. What distinguishes is about the method of implementation of the 
concept. In this case, NU explicitly rejects violent methods commonly 
performed by FPI, for example, raiding over cafes, nightclubs and 
other amusement centre, destroying places of worship of other groups, 
and attacking groups indicated defaming Islam. 
This was in line with the statement made by Deputy Secretary of 
PCNU Bangkalan, M. Fawwaz Toyyib Muslim: 
As a member of NU, I do not agree with anarchy or 
violence on the name of Islam which frequently committed 
by those groups. I do not mention who those groups are. 
But anyway, I do not agree with violence on the name of 
Islam because Islam is rah }matan li al-‘a >lami >n. So, if violence is 
chosen as a way, which one is called Islam as rah }matan li al-
‘a >lami >n? Besides, our country is democracy, so any problem 
occurs is at the hand of the authorities to settle. We are not 
allowed to do or judge someone whose thinking is 
different.26 
Reason of preventing violence in preaching is also the the reason 
why NU leaders want to get involved in, even to be a leader of, FPI 
Bangkalan. NU leaders cannot accept violence on the name of Islam as 
was done by FPI. So, when FPI entered into Bangkalan, the options 
were to decline or to domesticate it. Apparently, the latter option was 
taken. Kyai Fahrillah Aschal agreed to be the chairman of FPI 
Bangkalan by the reason for not providing opportunities for FPI to do 
violence in Bangkalan. 
Once I asked Kyai Fahri, “Kyai, why do you agree to be the 
chairman of FPI?” Kyai Fahri said: “If it is not me who hold 
FPI, this organization will be joined by others who might 
not be kyais. And it might be held by thugs. If it is they 
holding the FPI, it might always confront to kyais. So, when 
it is held by me, I do not think that FPI is radical.” He 
added: “The reason why I (Kyai Fahri) agree to become the 
                                                                
26 Interview with Toyyib Fawwaz Muslim, March 5th, 2011. 
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Chairman of FPI is due to the consideration not to give an 
opportunity to FPI applying violence in Madura. Thus, 
when FPI is held by me, there is nothing violent in 
Bangkalan, because we are favoring more onto dialogue.” 
Well, because the community asked Kyai Fahri to become 
the Chairman of NU, he released his position in FPI, and it 
was then handed over to Kyai Khon Tobroni in 2007.27 
From the above explanation it is obvious that the strategy which is 
taken by the NU leaders is de-radicalization from within. By looking at 
the influence of Kyai Fahrillah Aschal, FPI Bangkalan has to think 
twice in committing violence as happens elsewhere. If such a very 
influential kyai is willing to do violence, the impact can be highly 
counterproductive since he has so many adherents. The moderate 
vision of the two kyais leads to a very minimal use of violence by FPI 
Bangkalan. In fact, since it was held by Kyai Khon Tobroni, FPI 
Bangkalan has been idle in terms of its movement. 
However, to say that FPI Bangkalan never employs violence is also 
incorrect. The testimony of several people suggested that FPI 
Bangkalan has done few sweeping to amusement places, particularly 
when FPI was under the leadership of Kyai Fahrillah Aschal. T. F. 
Muslim’s statements below illustrate the behavior of FPI under the 
control of NU’s figures. 
Well, that’s no coincidence that IPNU has commissariat in 
almost all Islamic boarding schools. So, if there are any 
actions, they will automatically attend, like sweepings... 
Because he (Kyai Fahrillah Aschal, The first Chairman of 
FPI Bangkalan) is a very influential and also has many 
students and followers. Under his control, FPI was ever 
large and often appeared to make sweeping in illicit places, 
such as cafes, nightclubs in the square, and the back of the 
stadium.28 
                                                                
27 Interview with Toyyib Fawwaz Muslim, March 5th, 2011. 
28 Interview with the Branch Chairman of IPNU Bangkalan, M. Wahid, Maret 5th, 
2011; “Ra Fahrillah, before he became the head of NU, had also been the head of FPI. 
FPI under the leadership of Ra Fahrillah experienced rapid development, it never 
performed demonstrations, once moral call was heard by the House of representative 
in Bangkalan in the public hearing,” Said Sonhaji, the Branch Chairman of PMII 
Bangkalan (Interview, March 4th, 2011). 
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It can be stated here that FPI Bangkalan under the leadership of 
Kyai Fahrillah Aschal had made several sweepings as the cases of FPI 
elsewhere. Nevertheless, it was just very controlled action, so they did 
not do any damaging violence. The absence of an open clash could 
also be understood since Kyai Fahrillah Aschal had a lot of followers 
and a very wide influence. Consequently, his movement and action 
received approval from NU and Muslims in Bangkalan in general. 
If one thinks that a positive attitude towards FPI is only among the 
older generation, he or she could be wrong. The younger generations 
of NU Bangkalan also have a good assessment of the existence of FPI 
in Bangkalan. Below is a view of the figures of PMII (Indonesian 
Islamic Students Movement) Bangkalan, a student organization which 
is theologically affiliated to NU, and that of the figures of IPNU (NU 
Student Association), who are directly under NU. 
I think FPI Bangkalan is very well so far, and its existence is 
highly accepted by the community because the majority of 
people in Bangkalan are the pesantren’s students (santri). FPI 
is very nice and helpful in Bangkalan because it serves as 
moral control in Bangkalan. In addition, the majority of 
FPI’s figures in Bangkalan are also from the figures of NU 
like Kyai Badrus Sholeh, the current FPI’s Chairman. He is 
also a prominent leader of NU.... An average Madurese also 
agree with the FPI’s presence here, they are a moral 
community control.29 
...I do not agree with violence, but I agree with the presence 
of FPI here. It is because there must be a stringent Islamic 
organization like FPI so that people do not violate the rules 
but they follow the rules.... I personally accept FPI but it 
should not run an anarchic way. Even, there should be a 
group and community who support the existence of an 
organization like FPI. That is not to cause casualties, 
particularly those who are not guilty. The case of people’s 
misguided belief is their own problem and they should be 
responsible for themselves. So, FPI should be more 
dialogical. Meaning, by running dialogue, FPI will not be 
considered as an anarchist. And the point is that there 
                                                                
29 Interview with the Branch Chairman of PMII Bangkalan, Sonhaji, March 4th, 2011. 
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should be FPI in Indonesia because no one dares to do like 
that.30 
Taking those statements above into account, what we can see from 
the background of FPI’s coming and growth in Bangkalan is a story of 
an encounter of the two entities that had been considered impossible 
to meet. Since the beginning, FPI was very closely hand in hand with 
local leaders of NU. Holding local figures of NU is an accurate strategy 
that cannot be ignored if FPI wants to exist and thrive in Bangkalan. 
This strategy proves to have succeeded so far. 
The entire terrace leaders of FPI Bangkalan are very influential 
kyais of NU Bangkalan. They are the leaders of pesantren (Islamic 
boarding school) that have hundreds, even thousands of students as 
well as the devout followers in community. Not surprisingly, it can be 
said that the FPI’s members are the students and the people who have 
claimed themselves as NU followers and who have great obedience to 
kyais. Most of the people accept and view positively the existence of 
FPI. Moderate Islam and radical Islam thus have met. As quoted at the 
beginning of this paper, a progressive youth of NU amazed and 
murmured, “What sign is this?” 
The Encounter between Islamists and Traditional Islam: A 
Theoretical Reflection 
By looking at this phenomenon, we need to re-question the 
segregation of radical Islam and moderate Islam. Nowadays, radical 
Islam and moderate Islam are deemed as two separate entities. 
Integrating both is assumed to be impossible. Assumption like this is 
denying the sociological fact that the two groups live in the same social 
environment that can lead them to establish contact which influence 
each other. At least, the connectedness of the two groups could be 
caused by two things: a conservative attitude of the two groups in 
treating political and social situation in which they live. 
Conservative character of traditional Islam can be seen from the 
figures or sometimes also referred to as the traditional Islamic scholars. 
The kyai is known for a very high commitment to the heritage of 
classical Islamic scholarship which was formulated by the scholars in 
the formative era of Islamic sciences. With moral and scientific 
                                                                
30 Interview with M. Wahid, the Branch Chairman of IPNU Bangkalan, period 2009-
2011, March 5th, 2011. 
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qualifications they have, these scholars become the axis for the 
understanding of Islam and the movement among traditional Islam. 
These scholars were educated Muslims from the traditional Islamic 
educational institutions, which in Indonesia is often referred to as 
pesantren. They are experts in the field of classical Islamic sciences. 
Therefore, they assume themselves as the most authoritative one to 
speak on behalf of Islam. One of the characteristics of the scholars is a 
very strong determination to preserve the legacy of the classical Islamic 
scholarship.31 
Muhammad Qasim Zaman exemplifies the scholar’s attitude of 
this kind to the case of a Muslim scholar in Pakistan, Mawlana 
Muhammad Taqi ‘Uthmani. He asserts that the meaning of jihad 
includes aggression against non-Muslim nations. This answer is likely 
to be the radical understanding of Islam among Muslims. But, this 
assumption is completely wrong because these scholars only want to 
preserve the meaning of jihad as embodied in the books of classical 
Islamic heritage of great scholars of Islam in the past.32 
Here, it can be said that the traditional Muslim scholar is a 
conservative in terms of doctrine. However, he is not radical in the 
sense of radical Islamism because he did not commit any violence in 
his movement. 
On the other hand, Islamists are people or groups who treat Islam 
as an ideology of social and political movement. Some of them are 
educated from modern educational institutions, not from Islamic 
institutions. They have a strong commitment to implement Islamic law 
literally. For this group, Islam is believed to have provided technical 
guidelines for all aspects of life. Islamic commitment and literal 
understanding of the doctrine of Islam bring them into Muslim religio-
political activists who seek to build a society and an Islamic state in the 
modern era according to what the Prophet practiced in the past. The 
group is also called fundamentalist, revivalist, or radical Islamist, in 
which the latter is loaded with nuance of violence. 
In many cases, the relationship between Islamists and Muslim 
traditionalists is complex and contradictory. The Islamists accuse 
traditional Muslim scholars as the people who do not know the 
                                                                
31 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Pluralism, Democracy, and the Ulama,” in Robert W. 
Hefner (ed.), Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democaratization (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 69. 
32 Ibid., pp. 68-69. 
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problems of modern life. Knowledge of the classical scholars is 
deemed having no connection with the problems of society and is 
unable to resolve the problems of the people. On the other hand, the 
traditional Muslim scholars accuse the Islamists as not qualified to 
interpret Islamic teachings so that they are not qualified to speak on 
behalf of Islam. 
Activism, in socio-political issues, is a substance to distinguish 
between the Muslim scholars and the Islamists. The Islamists tend to 
be an activist who attempt to implement Islamic law as it is spelled out 
in the classical Islamic books. Whereas, Muslim scholars just treat it as 
a classical Islamic heritage that must be preserved. This attitude is 
frequently called as “theoretical defense.” 
Even so, there is a chance where the two groups come closer and 
work together. As mentioned above, both Muslim scholars and 
Islamists are essentially conservative. Both put liberal Muslims as their 
common enemy. The presence of liberal Islamic movement is 
considered endangering the basic principles of Islam. No wonder if 
one of the issues that unites conservative from the two groups is the 
limit of human’s reason in understanding Islam. According to Muslim 
scholars and Islamists, the human’s reason is only allowed to operate 
outside of what has been revealed by God. “And on this, the Islamists 
and `ulama>’ are in complete agreement,” said Zaman.33 
Not surprisingly, if a youth of NU sees Islam in the perspective of 
rational approach based on modern values it will contrast  to those of 
NU’s older generations. This is what we can see in Aliman Harish’s 
figure, a youth of NU graduated from IAIN (State Institute for Islamic 
Studies) and was the former activist of PMII Surabaya, and he is now 
active in a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) in the framework 
of strengthening democracy in society. 
He could not accept the fact that NU could be hand in hand with 
the FPI. He also could not accept the state intervention in the religious 
affairs of the people, an attitude which is clearly in contrast to NU. 
This attitude seems to be at odds with the strong endorsement of NU 
towards the FPI in Bangkalan. The argument used in looking at the 
issues of function of the state and religious freedom is also very 
different from those used by the NU’s management. 
                                                                
33 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 172. 
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I also wonder why the kyais in Madura are so close to FPI, 
so I guess that it is a must or for granted since the elderly 
kyais here learn from the classical books of the classical 
Muslim scholars in which they also teach what is 
championed by the FPI. The kyais in Madura are childish. I 
truly do not agree with the violent ways as practiced because 
our country is based on constitution. No right for everyone 
to judge someone who is considered to be different from 
his. In East Java, in general, the government or the 
Governor, Soekarwo, shows that they are in a depressed 
position and lose from the violent groups. As the 
publication of Governor’s regulation (East Java Governor 
Decree on the prohibition of the Ahmadiyya’s activities in 
East Java), I think that this is precisely the government’s 
attempt to legalize violence. I do not agree with the violent 
methods used by the FPI as a whole because our country is 
a constitutional state and does not justify any violence in the 
name of anything. It is only because Ahamadiyah is 
considered a misguided sect then its followers are not 
allowed to live in Indonesia? MUI’s fatwa (legal opinion) said 
that Governor Decree was forgetting the other sides, such 
as brotherhood and so on...34 
Thus, conservatism is what makes the traditional `ulama>’ (Muslim 
scholars) and Islamists unite and fight against liberal Muslims who are 
considered endangering Islam. Without realizing it, the excessive 
exposure of Islamic thought developed by liberal Islam has an impact 
on the fusion of the Islamists and the traditional Muslim scholars. 
Merging the two would generate thought and Islamic movement to be 
complementary to each other. The Islamists will gain theological 
legitimacy of the Muslim scholars, on the contrary the, Muslim 
scholars will support the Islamists’ ideas. 
The unity of both bring the Muslim scholars begin to enter the 
modern issues that have been the concentration among the Islamists, 
such as the resistance to Western values, secular rationalism that are 
deemed hostile to Islamic norms, the implementation of shari >’ah as a 
positive law, and so on. They oppose the promises offered by secular 
ideologies, such as liberalism, nationalism and socialism which are 
considered just nonsense. They perceive liberal Muslims as an agent of 
                                                                
34 Interview with Aliman Harish, the Branch Chairman of ANSOR Bangkalan and 
Director of Leksdam (Board of Social Studies and Democracy), March 4th, 2011. 
 
 
 
Ahmad Zainul Hamdi 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 07, Number 01, June 2013 
88 
all these secular ideologies. They also struggled to start Islamizing the 
country by offering shari>‘ah as the solution to all problems inflicting the 
nation.35 
The weakness of legitimacy and political control of the 
government is another factor that encourages Muslim scholars 
(`ulama>’) to be more active in politics. Green’s studies on attitudes and 
political behavior of the Muslim scholars in Tunisia concluded that one 
of the important variables that determined political behavior of the 
Muslim scholars was the government’s control. If the government has 
effective and strong control over society, Muslim scholars will tend to 
be passive. On the contrary, if the government does not have effective 
control, the leadership of the society will be taken over by scholars.36 
Thus, the involvement of scholars into practical politics depends on 
the strength or weakness of government’s control and legitimacy over 
the society. 
The fusion between the Muslim scholars and Islamists in Pakistan 
and Indonesia confirms such a matter. After Pakistan was formed, the 
government was still unstable. The first issue that arose was the place 
of Islam in Pakistan and non-Muslims status. Secular and liberal 
Muslims preferred to make Pakistan a secular state by making the UK 
as a model, while the Muslim scholars and Islamists wanted Islam as 
the ideology of state. Traditional `ulama>’ and Islamists wanted a 
theocracy, in which the state of Pakistan should be run based on the 
principles of Islam as political theory of Islam as set out in the classical 
works.37 
In Indonesia, the convergence between traditional Muslims and 
Islamists occurred in two periods. The first period was after its 
independence when the traditional Muslim scholars were working with 
Masyumi to make Islam as the ideology of the state. The second period 
was after the fall of Soeharto. Making Indonesia comes closer to Islam 
is one of the issues offered by the traditional Muslims and Islamists on 
                                                                
35 Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam, pp. 171-172. 
36 Arnold H. Green, “Political Attitudes and Activities of the Ulama in the Liberal Age: 
Tunisia as an Exceptional Case,” in Abubaker A. Bagader (ed.), The Ulama in the Modern 
Muslim Nation-State (Kuala Lumpur: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1983), p. 
172. 
37 Ahmad Aziz, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-1964 (London, Bombay, 
Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 238-241. 
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the grounds that the secular Indonesia has failed to provide the public 
goods for its people. 
In both cases, government’s control and legitimacy are weak since 
they were being in their transition period. This situation provides an 
opportunity for Muslim scholars entering the field of practical politics 
as a form of the sense of responsibility to guide the people. And when 
the kyais entered into the arena of practical politics, they have been 
hailed by the Islamists. Consequently, these two groups fuse with the 
mutual doctrine and movement reinforcing to one another. 
Radicalization-De-radicalization: The Price of an Encounter 
As stated before, the encounter between moderate Islam and 
radical Islam is possible because of the same view. Both make classical 
Islamic discourse as an Islamic ideal to be realized at this time if we 
want to build an ideal Muslim society. It is merely the ideal classical 
Islam which was originally a moral appeal among the traditional `ulama>’ 
that could turn into a blue print in political movements. The traditional 
`ulama>’ that were apolitical turned to be active politically by performing 
missionary movements that used political instruments. 
The changes in this movement occur when two prerequisites are 
met. First, the specific political situation in which traditional Islamic 
force has been able to control the political posts. Second, there is an 
encounter with Islamic force which is able to articulate Islamic ideals in 
terms of classical and modern political movements. 
In Bangkalan, the two prerequisites are fulfilled. Currently, both 
legislative and executive bodies are controlled by politicians from NU. 
Meanwhile, FPI has entered into Bangkalan and has closely linked 
since the beginning, even indistinguishable, with NU. Both have 
brought traditional `ulama>’ shifting their preaching activity from a 
politically inactive moral appeal to a more political missionary 
movement. 
This phenomenon actually represents the mainstream Islamic 
political view that sees Islam as di>n (religion) and dawlah (state). Political 
view that puts Islam as a primary reference is not able to avoid 
separating between Muslim citizens and non-Muslim citizens, where 
the latter is treated as the second class. This principle is diametrically in 
contrast with the principles of democratic governance, in which all 
citizens have the same status and are treated equally. Law is built on 
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the common grounds, and is not based on arguments of religious 
belief.38 
The principle of democracy is seen as an instance of secularism 
which is strongly opposed by both traditional Muslims and radical 
Islamists. On the other hand, the liberal Muslims view that the state 
should be managed according to the principles of modern democracy 
because it is only by democracy any form of discrimination can be 
avoided. Liberal Muslims also try to interpret Islam on the perspective 
of human rights. Likewise, they maintain that freedom of religion is the 
most fundamental right that must be recognized, including here is the 
right to convert, a view that is not accepted by the traditional and the 
radical Muslims alike who base their understanding on the formulation 
of the classical Islamic jurisprudence that applies capital punishment 
for those who leave Islam. 
If the traditional `ulama>’ can still meet with radical Islamic groups 
as bounded by the same Islamic and political views, so that between 
the traditional `ulama>’ and liberal Muslim scholars do not have any 
association except for the spirit of nonviolence. This is what we see 
today when the radical Islamic forces advanced, Islamic movements 
that promote democracy and human rights find themselves a minority. 
When the radical Muslims have joined with the traditional Muslims, 
they have turned into a majority Muslim force. Under these 
circumstances, it is no longer relevant to assume that radical Islam is a 
minority. 
On the other hand, the attitude of the view that the relationship 
between radical Islam and moderate Islam is a unidirectional 
relationship in which the latter merely simplifies the complexity of the 
                                                                
38 Masdar Hilmy discussed the problem of the relationship between political theory of 
Islam and democracy by dividing it into three categories: Huwaydian (a concept 
developed by Fahmi Huwaydi, who put Islam as compatible with democratic 
principles), Mawdudian (a concept developed by Mawdudi, who accepted democracy, 
but put Islam as the main reference), and Qutbian (a concept developed by Sayyid 
Qutb, who completely rejected the concept of democracy as it was considered as 
contrary to Islamic infidels). See Masdar Hilmy, “Muslims’ Approaches to Democracy: 
Islam and Democracy in Contemporary Indonesia,” Journal of Indonesian Islam, vol. 01, 
no.01 (June 2007), pp. 56-68; the same problem was also discussed by Bahtiar Effendy. 
He divided it into two groups: textual approaches to Islam which regard democracy as 
incompatible with Islam, and substantial approach that sees Islam and Muslims based 
on a basic concept in accordance with the principles of modern democracy. Bahtiar 
Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), chapter I. 
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object appears to be the case. The opposite view does not give any 
help in explaining this phenomenon. It is simply questionable to 
assume that since the moderate Islam is the majority, the closeness 
between the two would make the radical Islam idle. 
Every meeting of two similar groups will always bear a mutual 
relationship and mutual influence. The greatness of NU has no 
significant value in the encounter among FPI’s, NU’s, and the 
pesantren’s leaders in Bangkalan. This encounter is more determined by 
the bargaining power of each character that occurs not because of a 
formal collaboration among NU, FPI, and pesantren. Moreover, the 
reality also shows that most of the NU members are passive and silent 
majority, while the FPI members are very active. As a result, to 
consider that NU will dominate the encounter with FPI should be 
questioned seriously. 
In the context of this meeting, it is clear that FPI leaders cannot be 
underestimated, both in terms of their knowledge of Islam and their 
insights on the existing socio-political situation. Figures gathered in 
Bangkalan could be said to have the same degree of scientific 
qualifications. On the other hands, Rizieq Shihab’s capability in the 
field of classical Islamic scholarship represents a pride among the 
traditional Muslims that cannot be ignored. 
Rizieq Shihab is clearly less charismatic than Fahrillah Aschal in 
the eyes of Bangkalan Muslims. Precisely because of Fahrillah Aschal’s 
charisma, so that Rizieq approaches him to establish FPI in Bangkalan. 
Nevertheless, Rizieq obviously has other advantages, namely network, 
experience in organizing movement, access to politicians and media.39 
In this case, Rizieq will be able to put himself as a mentor in the 
movement. 
Conclusion 
By looking at various things, then the encounter between NU and 
FPI in Bangkalan will take effect in both directions. In less balanced 
degrees, NU becomes both the subject and object, so does FPI. NU 
                                                                
39 As previously predicted by Liddle, the scriptural Muslims would have huge political 
resources after the fall of Suharto. This prediction was based on the fact that they had 
access to the alliance and, in addition, were supported by politicians, media, and 
organizations. See R. William Liddle, “Skripturalisme Media Dakwah: Satu Bentuk 
Pemikiran dan Aksi Politik Islam Masa OrdeBaru,” translated by Ahmad Sahal and 
Saiful Mujani, in R. William Liddle, Islam, Politik dan Modernisasi (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar 
Harapan, 1997), p. 126. 
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cannot completely change FPI into NU in other cloth. In contrast, FPI 
cannot freely push NU to apply its agendas. 
For those who want NU remains moderate, they may be 
disappointed. The reality shows that the inclusion of FPI into NU’s 
community brings about increased radicalization within NU. As data 
has suggested, since the existence of FPI in Bangkalan, there have been 
several sweepings on illicit places. The flag used is FPI, but mostly the 
perpetrators are kyais with their students. 
On the other hand, for those who want NU shifts to be as radical 
as FPI, so that there will be no difference between both of them, they 
will also be disappointed. Since the beginning, Fahrillah stated that he 
would hold FPI in Bangkalan precisely to reduce the potential of 
violence and would not allow it to be face-to-face with NU and 
pesantren. Despite several time sweepings, the FPI’s movement was 
away from radical, if its radicalism is measured and identified with 
violence, as FPI has done so far elsewhere. 
What can be stated here is that the proximity of FPI and NU in 
Bangkalan bears de-radicalization and radicalization. The de-
radicalization happens in the body of FPI when compared to the FPI’s 
basic character as radical Islam to act violence everywhere. Meanwhile, 
radicalization occurs in the body of NU when compared to the NU’s 
basic character as a moderate Islamic organization which is away from 
violence in preaching Islam. Perhaps, this is the price to be paid in 
every encounter. [] 
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